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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the factors that influence roll call voting abstention in the United
States House of Representatives. I control for factors both at the individual level and the
institutional level. My data set includes all members of the House of Representatives from the
102nd (1991-1992) through the 107th (2001-2002) sessions of Congress. It is my intention to
contribute to our scholarly understanding of abstention behavior in the United States House of
Representatives and to help future research on Congressional roll call voting behavior. I find
strong empirical support for individual level effects, such as seniority, last of term of
Congressional service, and ideology. I also find support that institutional effects, such as party
dominance, impact roll call voting abstention.

vi

INTRODUCTION
Since the early years of the discipline, Congressional roll call voting has long been of
keen interest to political scientists. In recent years, scholars have examined voting behavior as a
measure of ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), as a measure of policy preferences (Krehbiel,
1991), and as evidence of careerism (Hibbing, 1991). However, the almost single-minded
scholarly focus on the decision to support or oppose a measure has overlooked the first choice
that a representative makes: the decision to vote or abstain. As a practical matter, this first
decision to participate can have consequences at least as important as those brought about by the
Yea or Nay vote; moreover, understanding the decision to participate or abstain can contribute to
our understanding of Congressional behavior overall. If we as political scientists seek to explain
turnout in the mass public, surely turnout in elite political institutions should also capture our
attention.
Abstention on roll call votes is a particularly interesting Congressional behavior to study
because of the structure of our representative democracy. According to Federalist Paper Number
10, the purpose of a representative democracy is "to refine and enlarge the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen
that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to
the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose". Article
I, Section I of the United States Constitution states that "All Legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." Members of the House of Representatives are the most direct link of
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representation for the populous. In principle, members of Congress should translate the desires
of the populous by enacting legislation. House members, representing their specific
constituencies, are the most direct voice of the people. When they abstain, no matter how
insignificant the outcome of the vote cast would be, it silences the voice of the people. As Fenno
notes, “It would be a tragedy if its representational strength goes unrecognized and unused
because the very representatives who make it strong are afraid to acknowledge that strength or
use it to help govern the country” (246-247). High to moderate levels of abstention raise serious
questions about the nature of our representative democracy.
Despite the importance of the “to vote or not” choice, abstention behavior is an area in
the Congressional roll call voting research that has not received adequate attention. Abstention
has either been ignored in the literature or assumed to be random. Noll points out that “unpaired
abstentions are usually assumed to occur randomly, such as when a legislator misses a plane or is
too ill to be wheeled to the floor on a gurney” (98). Yet it is unlikely that abstention behavior is
a stochastic one. We know as political scientists that members of Congress have particular
motivations regarding policy making and position taking, and so it is likely that this first decision
to participate is similarly calculated, rational choice on the part of the member. Nonetheless, the
few authors that have studied abstention behavior (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Fiorina 1974;
Hibbing 1991) have produced mixed conclusions about the determinants and significance of
abstention.
In this thesis, I address this gap in the literature by examining the factors that influence
individual-level abstention on roll call voting. If roll call abstention is a calculated, rational
choice of the member, then both individual level characteristics such as seniority, ideology,
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party, and district distance from Washington as well as institutional level-characteristics such as
balance of power within the chamber should influence abstention behavior.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
As noted above, roll call abstention has been overlooked or dismissed as random in much
of the research that examines it. Nonetheless, a number of works that focus on general
participation in Congress have examined a variety of factors that influence the choice to
participate.
Much of the prior literature on abstention behavior regards members of Congress as
rational actors who are seeking re-election. Mayhew (1957) describes reelection as the
proximate goal of every member of the House. It is the goal that must be attained before the
member can pursue public policy goals. “The ultimate concern here is not how probable it is that
legislators will lose their seats but whether there is a connection between what they do in office
and their need to be reelected” (1957). Put differently, there is likely a connection between
electoral “safety” in the district and behavior in Washington.
Drawing on this idea, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) argue that that members of Congress
are rational actors and, as such, choose to vote or to abstain based on their goal of maximizing
utility.

The decision to vote or to abstain can be modeled with the familiar equation
R = P(B) - C + D

where R is the net reward from voting, B is the material benefit brought about by voting, P is the
probability that one's vote will make a difference, C is the cost associated with voting, and D is
the fixed benefit of voting. For instance, in the legislative setting B is the benefit brought about
by the bill passing and P(B) is the expected utility of passage. In the legislative setting the costs
of voting might include missed opportunities to engage in other rewarding activities. In the
legislature, as well as in the mass public, D may represent the satisfaction of exercising one's
civic duty. Poole and Rosenthal predict that members will abstain if and only if
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R = (P(B)) - (C + D)) > 0
That is, members will abstain if and only if the benefits of abstention exceed the cost.
If members of Congress are rational actors pursuing re-election, what factors should
influence turnout? Electoral margin is one such factor. If members are rational seekers of reelection, then members with a strong base or larger electoral margin will behave differently than
those members from competitive districts. Cohen and Noll (1991) find that the behavior of
legislators is driven by the reelection motive rather than a consideration of playing a pivotal role
on any one roll call. They hypothesize that legislators view voting as costly because the time it
requires could be used in providing constituency service or raising money for future campaigns.
However, legislative outcomes influence constituents’ evaluations of their legislators, even when
neither legislators nor voters vote instrumentally (1991, 123). In an analysis of roll call votes
with high issue salience, they found that an issue is more likely to be salient to the constituency
if they are dissatisfied with the legislative outcome. In other words, legislators are more likely to
abstain when there is little conflict between constituency preferences and legislative outcomes.
When the constituency is satisfied by legislative performance, the member does not have
increased incentives for high levels of participation.
Seniority is another factor that likely influences the choice to participate. If we assume
that members conceive of benefits and costs primarily in terms of their reelection prospects, it
makes sense that seniority may be associated with changes in participation. Fenno (1978)
distinguished between freshman members and more senior members. He categorized members of
the House into two different career stages: expansionist and protectionist. In the first,
"expansionist" stage, members return home to the district quite often and are more concerned
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with re-election. These members are likely to avoid any behavior (such as abstention) that could
have an adverse effect on their re-election prospects. As a member becomes more senior and
develops a strong electoral base in their home district, he or she moves into the "protectionist"
stage, where they enjoy more behavioral freedom. In a quantitative study of roll call voting
behavior of individual members from 1947 through 1982, Hibbing found that more senior
members are less likely to participate in roll call votes (1991). As Hibbing notes, this "decline in
participation over the course of a career is not a particularly earth shattering finding" (1991). On
the other hand, Hibbing finds that "careerists" (or those who stay at least eight terms) have higher
participation rates overall.
Seniority may also have an influence at the end of one's career, when members are
presumably less concerned with re-election. Legislators who are leaving office (for retirement,
running of higher office, or electoral defeat) will no longer have the incentive to present their
electorate with a good voting record (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, 213). They are more likely to
“shirk” their duty to vote. Nonetheless, Poole and Rosenthal find that lame duck members
behave the same as other members, even after they distinguish between voluntary and nonvoluntary exits.
Geographic distance from the member's home district to Washington DC is another factor
that likely influences participation. Fenno (1977) noted that a member of Congress has two
separate careers, "one in the House and one at home" (171). These careers are not independent
of each other, and the time spent on one career is time which is spent away from the other.
Drawing on this idea, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) examine the possibility that members who live
further away from the nation's capital may be more likely to abstain. They find that the effect of
distance, while important, becomes less consistently important in the contemporary Congress.
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They offer two reasons for this. First, it is possible that representatives who live close to
Washington DC may actually find it easier to travel, and thus miss as many votes or more votes
than those who are elected from distant districts. Second, it is likely that improvements in
passenger-transportation technology makes travel much easier and less time-consuming, and that
the differences in travel time varies much less across representatives in the contemporary
Congress than it did even half a century ago.
The individual ideology of a member has also been shown to have an effect on roll call
voting behavior. Hibbing (1982) found evidence that “representatives with extreme ideological
positions are more likely to retire voluntarily than are moderates”. Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
add that extreme ideological members may feel “alienated” from many roll call votes.
Therefore, extreme ideologues were more likely to abstain because they are further spatially
from the roll call vote itself. It is reasonable to expect that more extreme members may be less
supportive of their political party, and less likely to participate.
According to John Aldrich, “political parties lie at the heart of American politics” (1995,
3). Partisanship is considered to be the most consistent predictor of roll call voting behavior.
The balance of power between the two parties is also likely a key determinant of abstention. The
closer the division, the higher the likelihood that a vote would make a difference and the more
incentive a legislator has to participate. Poole and Rosenthal argue that "turnout should be
higher when preferences on a roll call are evenly divided rather than being lopsided", because
members of Congress will be more assured of making a difference (1997, 210). They found that
in the 91st thru 100th sessions of the House that lopsided votes (votes that were not decided by a
close margin) have higher abstention rates. Poole and Rosenthal do not control for party
closeness of the chamber itself and only analyze the margins of individual votes. Patterson and
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Caldeira (1988) find that as the House becomes more polarized between Democrats and
Republicans, the levels of party line voting increase. It is reasonable to assume that the more
polarized a House is the “closer” roll call votes will become. Roll-call voting behavior in the
House has become increasingly polarized in recent years; the 1990’s can be characterized by a
strong, autonomous party government in the House (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1997). This only
increases the party’s need to influence their members’ roll call voting behavior. Given this
previous research, it makes intuitive sense that the balance of power across parties likely plays a
role in abstention behavior; members of both the majority and minority party will be less likely
to abstain when the majority party held an advantage of only a few seats.
This prior literature has made important contributions to our understanding of the choice
legislators make to participate. In this thesis, I contribute to this literature by modeling
abstention behavior at the individual level, by focusing on the balance of power within the
chamber, and by incorporating a wider range of explanatory variables.

Modeling abstention at

the individual level will provide better understanding of Congressional participation and voting
behavior.
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HYPOTHESES
In this thesis, I test the following hypotheses:
H1:

Members who are ideologically extreme will abstain more than moderate members.

H2:

Abstention will increase with seniority.

H3:

Freshman members will be less likely to abstain than other representatives.

H4:

Individual members in their last term of service will be more likely to abstain than other
members.

H5:

Electorally safe members will abstain more than those in relatively competitive districts.

H6:

Leaders will abstain more frequently than non-leaders.

H7:

Members who live farther from the capital will abstain more.

H8:

The more dominant the majority party is in terms of numerical balance, the less likely it
is that a member will abstain.
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DATA AND METHODS
The data used in this research is compiled from three major sources: The Almanac of
American Politics, the Poole and Rosenthal data set for Congress: A Political-Economic History
of Roll Call Voting, and http://thomas.loc.gov/, the official website for the US Congress. The
sessions of Congress used in this analysis are the 102nd thru the 107th. This is an appropriate
time period for this study, because party control and balance of power across the two parties
varied across these six sessions. The unit of analysis is the member of Congress; the dependent
variable is the proportion of votes on which the legislator abstained.
I have also included several independent variables explained more fully below:
Ideological Extremism
Democrats and Republicans are very ideologically diverse even within their own party
caucuses. As noted above, I hypothesized that ideological extremity is positively related to
abstention. Poole and Rosenthal D-Nominate scores are a common way to measure member
ideology in Congress. These scores range from -1 to 1, with -1 representing "very liberal" and 1
representing "very conservative". In this study, ideological extremity (EXTREME) is calculated
the absolute value of the Poole and Rosenthal D-NOMINATE scores. That is, the EXTREME
variable measures how far a member is from a moderate ideological position. I expect that
higher values of EXTREME will be associated with a greater incidence of abstention.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Ideological Extremity
Session Minimum Maximum Mean
102
0
0.84
0.346
103
0
0.84
0.3714
104
0
0.95
0.416
105
0.01
0.93
0.4233
106
0.02
0.93
0.438
107
0.02
1
0.4359
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Seniority
Hibbing (1991) finds that member seniority has a major effect on roll call voting
behavior. As noted above, I expect that seniority will be positively related to abstention.
Although not explicitly outlined by Hibbing, being a freshman may have an inverse effect,
because freshman representatives may be particularly concerned with the expectations of their
constituents and colleagues. Therefore, as noted above, I expect that freshman members will be
less likely to abstain. Conversely, members may be more likely to abstain at the end of their
service.
I include three variables that are designed to measure seniority. First, SENIOR is a
variable that measures the length (in years) of continuous membership in the House. Second,
FRESHMAN is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the representative is serving in his or her
first session of the House, and 0 otherwise. Third, I include as an independent variable a
measure of whether a member was a "lame duck" or was serving in their last term in Congress.
This variable (LAMEDUCK) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the member is in his/her final term
of membership and 0 otherwise.1
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Seniority
Session Minimum Maximum Mean
102
1
51
11.92
103
1
53
10.08
104
2
41
9.59
105
1
43
9.53
106
1
45
10.16
107
1
47
10.84

1

This variable does not distinguish among the reasons for becoming a lame duck. While it is true that there are a
variety of reasons why members of Congress leave the institution (illness, retirement, political ambition, legal
troubles, or defeat), all of these factors would likely contribute to increased abstention. Therefore all members
serving in their last term are coded as 1, and all continuing members are coded as 0.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, First Term of Service
Session Minimum Maximum Mean
Total
Freshman
In Session
102
0
1
0.1152 49
103
0
1
0.2592 111
104
0
1
0.212
91
105
0
1
0.1793 77
106
0
1
0.1011 43
107
0
1
0.0972 41
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Last Term of Service
Session Minimum Maximum Mean
102
0
1
0.23
103
0
1
0.183
104
0
1
0.161
105
0
1
0.092
106
0
1
0.092
107
0
1
0.144
Electoral Safety
According to Mayhew (1974), the primary goal of any member of Congress is to gain
reelection. During election years, an opponent can easily use the Congressional voting
attendance record as a means of discrediting his or her opponent. Therefore, as noted above, I
expect that members who are electorally at risk are less likely to abstain than members holding
relatively safe seats. The variable MARGIN is the percentage of the vote that the member won
in his/her district in the last election. Members who were recently elected in a close race are
likely to abstain less than other, safer members; and I expect MARGIN to be negatively related
to abstention. In other words, as MARGIN increases, so should levels of abstention.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics, Electoral Margin
Session Minimum Maximum Mean
102
43
100
68.99
103
44
100
63.22
104
43
100
66.15
105
43
100
64.26
106
48
100
70.47
107
48
100
68.66
Leadership Status
In the U.S. House of Representatives, there are a variety of possible leadership positions,
including party leader, committee leader, and subcommittee leader. As noted above, the
behavior of leaders may be different in important ways than the behavior of rank-and-file
members. Members who have these added responsibilities have more time constraints than the
average rank and file member. Members serving in the top leadership positions are expected to
spend their time persuading rank and file members to support the party position, and committee
and subcommittee chairs are expected to spend their time researching, writing, and amending
legislation. These commitments may cause the member to abstain more frequently. For
instance, the member with the highest rate of abstention in the 106th and 107th sessions of
Congress was Denis Hastert, Speaker of the House. To control for the effect of holding
leadership positions within the House, I created 3 dummy variables: PLEAD, COMLEAD, and
SUBLEAD. PLEAD is coded 1 if the member is in a party leadership position, 0 otherwise.
COMLEAD is coded 1 if the member is a committee chair, 0 otherwise. SUBLEAD is coded 1
if the member is a subcommittee chair, 0 otherwise.
Travel Distance to Washington, DC
According to Fenno, members have two careers, “one in the House and one at home”
(171). Members from districts surrounding (or, in driving distance to) the Washington D.C. area
are likely to behave differently than those whose districts require a lengthy travel time. Even
13

with more frequent and quicker flights to and from DC, members who live farther away like face
a completely different set of travel time constraints. I therefore expect such members to abstain
more frequently than members who live closer to Washington D.C. To control for this I include
a variable (DISTANCE) which measures the number of miles between the member’s state
capital to Washington, DC. I use the state capital as the comparison standard because I expect
little behavioral difference between, for instance, the member in the 1st district of Texas from the
member representing the 22nd district of Texas. The maximum distance for a member to travel is
3,806 miles (Alaska) and the shortest distance is 32.96 miles (Maryland). The average value for
DISTANCE is 1,087 miles with a standard deviation of 901 miles.
In this thesis, I perform two sets of OLS analyses. The first set of analyses are six cross
sectional OLS analyses, one of each session Congress. By analyzing each session separately, I
can account for session specific effects. Each cross sectional analysis will include all
independent variables described above.
As noted above, I hypothesized that the closer the difference between the majority and
minority party is, the greater the incentive for both parties not to abstain. In order to examine the
effect of party balance on membership abstention behavior, I conduct an OLS regression analysis
of all six sessions under consideration; that is, all six sessions are pooled. Majority Party
Dominance (PARTYDOM) is measured as the difference in percentage of seats between the
majority and minority parties, and is expected to be positively associated with abstention.
Descriptive information on Majority Party Dominance is included in Table 6 and Figure 1.

14

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, Majority Party Dominance
Session

Democrats

Republicans

102

267

167

Percentage of Seats
(majority party)
61.4%

Percentage of Seats
(minority party)
38.4%

Majority Party
Dominance
23.0%

103

258

176

59.3%

40.5%

18.9%

104

204

230

52.9%

46.9%

6.0%

105

206

228

52.4%

47.4%

5.1%

106

211

223

51.3%

48.5%

2.8%

107

212

221

50.8%

48.7%

2.1%

300
250
200
Democrats

150

Republicans

100
50
0
Democrats

102 103 104 105 106 107
267 258 204 206 211 212

Republicans 167 176 230 228 223 221

Figure 1: Partisan Break Up, 102nd-107th Session
Finally, because of the importance of party in structuring Congressional behavior and
outcomes, I control for partisanship (coded 1 as Democrat, and 0 otherwise). Poole and
Rosenthal argued that majority party members would be more free to abstain from voting;
therefore, in the pooled analysis, I also control for majority party status. In Table 7, I present
summary information regarding the measurement of the variables, and the direction of their
relationship with abstention.
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Table 7: Variable Descriptions, Measurements, and Hypothesized Effects
Variable
PERABS

Variable Description
Total proportion of abstention

PARTYDOM

Measure of party dominance

PARTY

Partisanship of the member

EXTREME

Measure of ideology

LAMEDUCK

Last term of service

DISTANCE

Distance to Washington

SENIOR

PLEAD

Measures the years served in
Congress
First year members of
Congress
Member of party leadership

COMLEAD

Committee Leader

SUBLEAD

Subcommitee Leader

MARGIN

Percentage of electoral safety

FRESHMAN

Coded
Continuous Variable
Proportion of times member abstained
on roll call votes that session
Continuous Variable
Difference between seats controlled by
majority party and minority party
Dummy Variable
(1if Democrats, 0 otherwise)
Continuous Variable
Absolute value of DNOM score
Dummy Variable
(1if in last term of service, 0 otherwise)
Continuous Variable
Distance (in miles) from member's state
capital to Washington, DC
Continuous Variable
Length of service (in years)
Dummy Variable
(1 for first term, 0 otherwise)
Dummy Variable
(1 if party leader, 0 otherwise)
Dummy Variable
(1 if committee leader, 0 otherwise)
Dummy Variable
(1 if subcommittee leader, 0 otherwise)
Continuous Variable
Percentage of votes won in previous
election
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Hypothesized Effect
(dependent variable)

Positive

Ambiguous
Positive
Positive
Ambiguous

Postive
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive

FINDINGS
First, I compare “high abstainers” to “low abstainers”. High abstainers are defined as
representatives who abstained on at least 10% of roll call votes. Low abstainers are defined as
representatives who abstained on less than 4% of roll call votes. Information regarding the
electoral safety, ideological extremism, and status as “lame duck” representatives or as first year
representatives is presented in Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8: Descriptive Information on High Abstainers, Per Session

1
2

Session

“Safe”
1
Members

102
103
104
105
106
107
Total

44.8% (30)
57.1% (20)
48.3% (14)
54.2% (13)
70.7% (29)
67.2% (21)
55.8% (140)

2

Extremists

7.5% (5)
5.7% (2)
0% (0)
0% (0)
7.3% (3)
0% (0)
4% (10)

Last
Session

Freshman

58.2% (39)
40.0% (14)
48.3% (14)
41.7% (10)
31.7% (13)
41.9% (13)
45.0% (113)

4.5% (3)
11.4% (4)
0% (0)
0% (0)
2.4% (1)
0% (0)
3.2% (8)

Number of
High
Abstainers
67
35
29
24
41
31
251

Electoral margin in last election of at least 65%
For conservatives, dwnom ≥ .75; for liberals, dwnom ≤ -.75
Table 9: Descriptive Information on Low Abstainers, Per Session

1
2

Session

“Safe”
1
Members

102
103
104
105
106
107
Total

43.7% (97)
31.1% (84)
43.9% (136)
29.7% (87)
48.8% (120)
44.2% (114)
38.3% (725)

2

Extremists

0.9% (2)
0.7% (2)
1.9% (6)
2.0% (6)
2.4% (6)
4.7% (12)
2.1% (40)

Last
Session

Freshman

12.6% (28)
14.4% (39)
11.3% (35)
6.5% (19)
4.9% (12)
8.9% (23)
9.2% (175)

18.0% (40)
31.9% (86)
26.5 (82)
22.9% (67)
14.2% (35)
14.3% (37)
21.9% (414)

Number of
Low
Abstainers
222
270
310
293
246
258

Electoral margin in last election of at least 65%
For conservatives, dwnom ≥ .75; for liberals, dwnom ≤ -.75

It is clear that abstention is not commonplace; nonetheless, many legislators miss at least
ten percent of all roll call votes. The information presented in these tables provides preliminary
support for several of my hypotheses. Recall that in H1, I hypothesized that members who are
ideologically extreme will abstain more than moderate members. The results here are somewhat
mixed. On average, about 2% of low abstainers were extreme ideologues. Extreme ideologues
17

made up only slightly more of the high abstainers (3.42%). My second hypothesis, that
electorally safe members would abstain more, is supported. On average, 57% of high abstainers
were from electorally safe districts compared to 40.23% of low abstainers were from safe
districts.
The comparison between low and high abstainers suggests that the amount of abstention
depends in large part on seniority. In H3, I hypothesized that freshman members will be less
likely to abstain than other members. Across all sessions, freshman members made up only 3%
of the high abstainers groups, but 21% of the low abstainer groups. The strongest support was
found for the fourth hypothesis, that individual members in their last term of service will be more
likely to abstain than other members. Only 9.7% of low abstainers were in their last terms of
service, compared to 43% of high abstainers. Clearly, the high abstainers were substantially more
likely to be serving in their last session.
The results in these preliminary analyses indicate that there are some individual level
characteristic variations that have an impact on levels of abstention. However, one of the
contributions of this thesis is to consider the effect of each variable while controlling for all the
others. Therefore, I perform six cross-sectional OLS analyses, followed by a pooled OLS
analysis. In Table 10, the results of the six cross-sectional OLS analyses are presented and in
Table 11 the pooled analyses results are presented.
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Table 10: Influences on Abstention, 102nd through 107th Sessions
Variable
102
103
-0.002
-0.041**
{-0.152}
{-2.865}
Partisanship
0.016**
0.007
(PARTY)
{2.858}
{1.538}
Ideological Extremity
0.056***
0.056***
(EXTREME)
{3.648}
{4.295}
Last term of service
0.049***
0.037***
(LAMEDUCK)
{7.683}
{6.564}
0.005*
-0.002
Distance to DC¹
{1.668}
{-0.635}
(DISTANCE)
Seniority
0.001*
0.001***
(SENIOR)
{1.903}
{3.29}
First term of service
-0.012
-0.003
(FRESHMAN)
{-1.219}
{-0.53}
Party leadership
0.0003
-0.003
(PLEAD)
{0.042}
{-0.45}
Committee leadership
-0.014
-0.003
(COMLEAD)
{-1.538}
{-0.391}
Subcommittee leadership
0.003
-0.008
(SUBLEAD)
{0.48}
{-1.482}
Electoral margin
0.0001
0.0007***
(MARGIN)
{0.468}
{3.738}
r²
0.21
0.190
adjusted r²
0.187
0.175
Dependent Variable=PERABS
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
¹In thousands of miles
(Constant)

Session
104
-0.019
{-1.559}
0.021***
{5.448}
0.019*
{1.669}
0.029***
{5.901}
0.002
{.947}
0.001***
{4.085}
0.001
{.088}
0.001
{.145}
-0.012
{-1.443}
-0.002
{-.517}
0.0002*
{1.809}
0.23
0.207

105
-0.024*
{-1.860}
0.009**
{2.198}
0.031**
{2.291}
0.0217***
{3.084}
0.003
{1.240}
0.002***
{5.645}
0.002
{.384}
-0.009
{-1.144}
0.001
{.153}
-0.009**
{-2.111}
0.0004**
{1.986}
0.19
0.171

106
0.004
{.248}
0.006
{1.130}
0.049**
{2.806}
0.064***
{6.715}
-0.001
{-.627}
0.001**
{2.412}
-0.011
{-1.077}
0.004
{.814}
-0.018*
{-1.676}
-0.002
{-.406}
0.0001
{.604}
0.13
0.11

107
0.005
{.470}
0.002
{.473}
0.031**
{2.569}
0.028***
{5.306}
-0.001
{-.445}
0.001***
{3.543}
-0.012*
{-1.650}
0.006
{1.091}
-0.006
{-.813}
-0.005
{-1.168}
0.0002
{1.055}
0.15
0.127

The results indicate that, as hypothesized in H1, members who are ideologically extreme
abstain more than moderate members, and that this result holds even when controlling for
partisanship. Seniority also has the hypothesized effect on abstention: more senior members
tend to abstain more. Moreover, even when controlling for seniority, members in their last term
of service abstain more frequently than mid-career legislators; indeed, the standardized
coefficients of the variables indicate that lame duck members are the most likely to abstain. As
hypothesized in H5, representatives elected from relatively safe district consistently abstain more
frequently; this effect is statistically significant in three of the sessions analyzed.
19

The third hypothesis, that freshman would be less likely to abstain, receives less support
in these analyses. It is only in the expected direction in four of the six sessions, and the
parameter estimate reaches statistical significance only in the last (107th) session considered.
Similarly, the sixth hypothesis receives at best mixed support; party leaders and committee
leaders do not consistently abstain more often than non-leaders. Subcommittee chairs do abstain
more frequently than others, but the estimate is only significant in the last session analyzed.
Finally, H7 received little support; distance from the nation’s capital has a significant effect in
only one of the six sessions.

In Table 11, the results of the pooled OLS analysis are presented.
Table 11: Influences on Abstention, Pooled Sessions 2
Variables

Parameter Estimates

(Constant)

-0.018**
{-3.046}

Majority Party Dominance

0.038***

(PARTYDOM)

{3.252}

Partisanship

0.011***

(PARTY)

{4.961}

Majority Party

0.0008

(MAJPARTY)

{.422}

Ideological Extremity

0.0413***

(EXTREME)

{7.342}

Last Term of Service

0.036***

(LAMEDUCK)

{13.881}

Distance to DC¹

.008

(DISTANCE)

{.811}

Seniority of Member

0.0014***

(SENIOR)

{8.674}

First Term of service

-0.007**

(FRESHMAN)

{-2.320}

Party Leader

0.001

(PLEAD)

{.217}

2

In an alternative analysis, I omitted the PARTYDOM variable and included five dummy variables to control for
session specific effects. The results were substantively the same as those presented.
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(Table 11 continued)
Committee Leader

-0.004

(COMLEAD)

{-1.215}

Subcommittee Leader

-0.005**

(SUBLEAD)

{-2.292}

Electoral Margin

0.0003***

(MARGIN)

{4.020}

r²

0.151

adjusted r²
Dependent
Variable=PERABS

0.148

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
¹In thousands of miles

The results of the pooled analysis support most the hypotheses presented above.
Extremists abstain more frequently than moderates. More senior members abstain more
frequently, and being in one’s last year of service has the most pronounced effect on abstention.
Freshman are less likely to abstain than others. Safe members are also more likely to abstain.
Distance does not have a significant effect. Contrary to expectations, subcommittee chairs are
less likely to abstain. The pooled analysis indicates that majority party dominance does have an
effect on the degree of abstention; greater dominance between the parties leads to more
abstention.
Expected levels of abstention for hypothetical cases are presented in Table 12. These
expected levels underscore the importance of seniority in determining abstention. While the
differences across seniority levels is not enormous, it is clear that more senior members are more
likely to abstain. Moreover, ideological extremity appears important; moderate members appear
to abstain less.
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Table 12: Expected Levels of Abstention
Predicted
Abstention
Hypothetical Case
Legislator in first year
0.065
Legislator in fifth (but not last) year
0.077
Legislator in tenth (but not last) year
0.083
Legislator in tenth and last year
0.115
Legislator in twentieth (but not last)
year
0.092
Legislator in twentieth and last year
0.128
Legislator in Chamber where Parties
are Balanced (party dominance=.02)
Legislator in Chamber where Majority
Party Dominates (party
dominance=.23)
Very Extreme Legislator (extreme=1)
Very Moderate Legislator (extreme=0)
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0.08

0.09
0.066
0.108

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
My findings both complement and add to much of the prior literature on abstention.
Analyzing the 102nd through 107th Congress, I find that more extreme members are more likely
to abstain; this reinforces Poole and Rosenthal’s findings from earlier Congresses. Moreover, I
find that this effect persists even when controlling for partisanship. This finding is consistent
with relatively extreme members feeling alienated from typical legislative proposals, and
relatively moderate members having a higher stake in the process and outcome. Moreover, like
Hibbing, I find that seniority is associated with abstention; senior members abstain more
frequently. Like Poole and Rosenthal, I find that members in their last term are substantially
more likely to abstain than other members; I contribute to prior literature by demonstrating that
this effect holds even when controlling for seniority. It is likely that, as Poole and Rosenthal
reason, “lame duck” members feel less beholden to their constituencies, and are more free to
“shirk”. I also contribute to prior literature by demonstrating that first-year representatives are
more likely to participate, even when controlling for overall seniority. In previous literature, the
seniority effect has been viewed as based in part on the electoral safety that senior incumbents
often enjoy; however, in this analysis, the seniority effect remained quite large even after
controlling for electoral margin. Like earlier literature, I find little effect of distance from the
nation’s capital. As Poole and Rosenthal suggest, innovations in travel and communication may
have erased the importance of distance.
This thesis also contributes to prior literature in several additional ways. First, I find that
the numerical balance across the parties matters, even when controlling for majority party status
and partisanship. It is likely that minority members feel more compelled to participate when
there is a higher chance of victory, and majority members feel more compelled to participate
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when there is a greater chance of defeat. Second, I examine the effect of leadership; in the
pooled analysis, contrary to expectations, subcommittee leaders were less likely to abstain.
Much of the work of Congress takes place in these subcommittees; it is possible that these
members are selected in part because of their productivity. Moreover, they may serve as
information specialists whose role is to give cues to other members; therefore their participation
may be particularly important. They may also be particularly heavily lobbied by interest groups
and other outside parties. More research should be done examining the role of leadership in
participation. Third, I find that Republicans are consistently less likely to abstain. The reasoning
for this is unclear; it is possible that Republicans built up norms during their years in the
minority party, particularly in the early 1990s when it became clear that majority party status was
within striking distance. And fourth, I contribute to prior literature by examining the effect of
margin; electorally safe members are more likely to abstain. This finding is compatible with the
rational choice argument that the decision to abstain is based in large part on a cost-benefit
analysis. If the primary goal of members of Congress is to be (re)elected, more electorally
vulnerable members have more of an incentive to be productive.
There are several promising avenues for future research. First, more work should be
done examining the distinct effects of partisanship and majority party status of the individual
member, and party balance within the chamber. More research should be done examining
institutional-level effects, individual member effects, and individual roll-call effects. Finally,
more research should be done applying these theories of participation to participation defined
broadly, beyond abstention.
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